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 Ardavan Arzandeh * 
 CASES 
 231.  Crociani  v  Crociani  1  
 Confl ict of laws—allocation of jurisdiction—“forum for the administration of the trusts” 
clause in a trust deed—application for stay of proceedings 
 This case concerned litigation arising from an alleged breach of trust. The settlor had 
created the trust in 1987 for the benefi t of her daughters. Under its cl.12(6), the trust 
deed had specifi ed that “. . . the rights of all persons and the construction and effect of 
every provision hereof shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of and construed only 
according to the law of the said country which shall become the forum for the administration 
of the trusts hereunder”. Jersey-based trustees administered the trust between 2007 and 
2011. In 2011, a Mauritian company took over from the Jersey trustees and became the 
trust’s sole trustee. 
 Shortly thereafter, the respondents, who were some of the benefi ciaries, commenced 
proceedings in Jersey against the appellants, who consisted of the settlor, the Jersey and 
Mauritian trustees, alleging various breaches of trust. In response, the appellants sought 
to stay those proceedings. Their main contention was that, by virtue of cl.12(6) of the 
trust deed, the administration of the trust by a Mauritian company meant that dispute in 
the instant case had to be subjected to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Mauritian courts. 
The fi rst instance and appeal court in Jersey both rejected the appellants’ contention. 
Thereafter, the appellants appealed to the Privy Council. 
 For present purposes, the Privy Council was presented with two key questions: (1) did 
cl.12(6) of the trust deed act as an exclusive jurisdiction clause, affording jurisdiction to 
the Mauritian court? If so, then (2) should the proceedings in Jersey be stayed? 
 Decision : Appeal dismissed. 
 Held : (1) The phrase “forum for the administration of the trusts”, in cl.12(6), did not 
amount to a jurisdiction clause. Even if it did, it was doubtful that it intended to confer 
 exclusive jurisdiction on the Mauritian courts. (2) Even if the Board had been persuaded 
that cl.12(6) conferred exclusive jurisdiction on the Mauritian court, it was still justifi ed 
for the court in Jersey to sustain its proceedings. 
 Comment : In essence, the fi rst question was concerned with the interpretation of the 
phrase “forum for the administration of the trusts”. The ruling clarifi es that the phrase 
 * Lecturer in Law, University of Bristol. 
 1 .  [2014] UKPC 40; noted Tan Ruo Yu [2015] LMCLQ 278. 
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identifi es the  place from which the trust is administered and that it should not be regarded 
as affording exclusive jurisdiction to the  courts in that place.  2  
 The Privy Council’s pronouncements on the second question were  obiter . The Board 
stated that “it should be less diffi cult for a benefi ciary to resist the enforcement of an 
exclusive jurisdiction clause in a trust deed than for a contracting party to resist the 
enforcement of such a clause in a contract”.  3  In other words, the Board took the position 
which differentiates between trust deed and contractual exclusive jurisdiction clauses, 
meaning that it is easier to depart from the former than the latter type of provision. 
 232.  Haeger & Schmidt GmbH  v  Mutuelles du Mans assurances IARD  4  
 Confl ict of laws—choice of law governing a contract for carriage of goods in the absence 
of an express choice—interpretation of Rome Convention, Art.4(1), (2), (4) and (5) 
 In 2002, VT, a French company, entered into a carriage of goods contract with another 
French company, S. The contract provided for the transportation of a transformer from 
Belgium to France. S then, in its own name but on behalf of VT, commissioned H&S, a 
German company, to transport the transformer. H&S, in turn, contracted the services of L, 
a French carrier. The transformer sank during loading. VT sued S and H&S in France for 
losses that it had suffered. H&S sought to add L and his French insurer, M, as third parties 
to the French proceedings. 
 After a long process of litigation, the main question which the  Cour de cassation in 
France had to consider concerned the dispute’s applicable law. In these circumstances, 
it asked the Court of Justice of the European Union (“ECJ”) to rule on three main 
questions: (1) Does a commission contract for the carriage of goods fall within the scope 
of Rome Convention, Art.4(4)? (2) If the applicable law to a contract of carriage cannot be 
ascertained under Art.4(4), should the applicable law be determined under Art.4(1) or (2)? 
(3) If the answer to question (2) is that Art.4(2) is the relevant provision to be resorted to, 
then would the applicable law be ascertained in accordance with where the fi rst agent (in 
this case S) had its habitual place of business? 
 Held : (1) A commission contract which has the transportation of goods as its principal 
purpose falls within the scope of Art.4(4). In this instance, it is for the French court 
to decide whether the commission contract was principally concerned with carriage of 
goods. (2) Where it is not possible to ascertain the law governing a carriage of goods 
contract under Art 4(4), Art.4(1) should be consulted. (3) As a starting point, the law 
governing a contractual dispute which falls within Art.4(2) should be identifi ed, based on 
the terms of that Article. Any comparison concerning the degree of connection between 
the contract and a country other than the one identifi ed under Art.4(2), should happen 
once it is claimed, under Art.4(5), that the contract is more closely connected with the 
other country. 
 2 .  At [19]. 
 3 .  At [35]. 
 4 .  (Case C-305/13) [2014] ECR I-0000; [2015] QB 319. 
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 233.  Hejduk  v  EnergieAgentur NRW GmbH  5  
 Confl ict of laws—allocation of jurisdiction under Brussels regime—matters relating to 
tort, delict or quasi-delict—interpretation of Brussels I Regulation, Art.5(3) 
 H is an Austrian photographer. E is a German entity. H alleged that E had published online 
some of her photographs without her permission. Accordingly, she started copyright 
infringement proceedings in Austria against E. One of the main issues for consideration 
related to the Austrian court’s jurisdiction to entertain the dispute. H argued that the court 
had jurisdiction pursuant to Brussels I Regulation, Art.5(3). E challenged that submission. 
It, in turn, contended that its website was not directed to Austria and the Austrian court did 
not have jurisdiction merely because the website was accessible in Austria. 
 In these circumstances, the Austrian court asked the ECJ to give a preliminary ruling on 
the following question: does the court of Member State A have jurisdiction to entertain the 
claim by means of Art.5(3) if rights relating to copyright protected under the laws in that 
jurisdiction are infringed following the online publication of the relevant materials on a 
website operated in Member State B, but accessible in Member State A? 
 Held : The court of Member State A will have jurisdiction under Art.5(3) in relation 
to damage suffered within its territory, notwithstanding that the online copyright 
infringement—which had happened on a website operated from Member State B—had 
not been directed to Member State A. 
 Comment : The ECJ drew a clear distinction between the interpretation of Art.15(1)(c),  6  
on the one hand, and Art.5(3), on the other. Consequently, it ruled that the fact that the 
German-operated website, on which the alleged copyright infringement had happened, 
was not directed at Austria had no bearing on the Austrian court’s competence to assume 
jurisdiction under Art.5(3). 
 234.  Hi Hotel  v  Spoering  7  
 Confl ict of laws—allocation of jurisdiction under Brussels Regime—matters relating 
to tort, delict or quasi-delict—copyright infringement—interpretation of Brussels I 
Regulation, Art.5(3) 
 The claimant, S, was a German photographer. In 2003, he took a number of photos of the 
various rooms inside a hotel run by HH, the defendant French hotel. Without entering into 
a written agreement, S allowed HH to use the photographs for advertising purposes. Some 
fi ve years later, S noticed that some of those photographs were used in a book published 
by P-V, a German publisher. Soon thereafter, S commenced proceedings in Germany 
against HH, accusing it, among other things, of copyright infringement by reason of the 
unauthorised passing of the photographs to P-V.  8  It was claimed in the German proceedings 
 5 .  (Case C-441/13) [2015] ECR I-0000. 
 6 .  See, eg,  Pammer v  Reederei Karl Schluter GmbH & Co KG (Case C-585/08) [2010] ECR I-12527; [2012] 
All ER (EC) 34. 
 7 .  (Case C-387/12) [2014] ECR I-0000; [2014] 1 WLR 1912. 
 8 .  These rights were protected in Germany. 
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that HH had passed on the photographs to P-V’s sister company in France which had, in 
turn, remitted them to P-V. 
 In these circumstances, the German court sought a reference from the ECJ on the 
interpretation of Brussels I Regulation, Art.5(3): where a defendant has been party to an 
alleged tortious act committed in Member State X, but damages have ensued from that act 
in Member State Y, would the court in Member State Y have jurisdiction under Art.5(3)? 
 Held : The court in Member State Y has jurisdiction, pursuant to Art.5(3), only on the 
basis that Member State Y was where the damage in question occurred. In such an instance, 
the court’s jurisdiction is confi ned to ruling on damages that have occurred within the 
territory within which it is located. 
 Comment : In this case, the ECJ built on its earlier decisions in cases such as  Pinckney 
v  KDG Mediatech AG  9  and  Melzer v  MF Global UK Ltd .  10  Accordingly, it emphasised 
that, for the purposes of Art.5(3), the phrase “place where the harmful event occurred 
or may occur” relates to “both the place where the damage occurred and the place of the 
causal event giving rise to the damage”.  11  On the facts of this case, the alleged tort had 
happened in France. However, S had suffered harm in Germany which, consequently, gave 
the German court jurisdiction under Art.5(3) to entertain a claim concerning the damage 
suffered in Germany. 
 235.  Irmengard Weber  v  Mechthilde Weber  12  
 Confl ict of laws—allocation of jurisdiction under Brussels regime—interface between 
Brussels I Regulation, Art.22 and Art.27(1) 
 IW and MW were two sisters who co-owned a property in Germany. In 1971, IW had 
been given an  in rem pre-emption right over MW’s 40% share of the property. In 2009, 
MW agreed to sell her share to Z, a German company. Once notifi ed of MW’s agreement 
with Z, IW chose to exercise her pre-emption right and MW’s share was transferred to her. 
Subsequently, Z commenced proceedings in Italy against IW and MW, challenging IW’s 
exercise of the pre-emption right and seeking to have it declared invalid. While the Italian 
proceedings were pending, IW started an action in Germany against MW. The basis of 
IW’s claim in the German proceedings was for MW to be ordered to register the transfer 
of her interest in the property to IW in the Land Register. 
 In these circumstances, the German court referred a number of questions to the ECJ 
for preliminary ruling. The following two questions were especially signifi cant: (1) Does 
the case before the German court fall within the scope of Art.22? If so, (2) should the 
German court, as the court second seised, decline its jurisdiction, as otherwise required 
under Art.27, by reason of the pending Italian proceedings? 
 Held : (1) The German proceedings concerned a matter which fell squarely within the 
scope of Art.22. (2) In a case where the court second seised has exclusive jurisdiction 
by means of Art.22, it is not obliged to decline its jurisdiction in favour of the court fi rst 
  9 .  (Case C-170/12) [2013] ECR I-0000; [2014] ILPr 7; noted [2014] IMCLY § 308. 
 10 .  (Case C-228/11) [2013] ECR I-0000; [2013] QB 1112; noted [2014] IMCLY § 306. 
 11 .  At [27]. 
 12 .  (Case C-438/12) [2014] ECR I-0000. 
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seised. After all, in such a case, any ruling by the court fi rst seised would be unenforceable, 
pursuant to Art.35. 
 Comment : In so far as the scope of Art.22 is concerned, the ECJ’s ruling in this case is 
consistent with its earlier pronouncements. On a number of occasions in the past, the ECJ 
had stated that the court of the place where the immovable property is located is the best 
place to entertain any dispute relating to that property.  13  
 This is the fi rst instance where the Court of Justice was asked to make a preliminary 
ruling on the interrelationship between Art.22 and Art.27. An earlier ruling, in  Erich 
Gasser GmbH v  MISAT Srl  14  on the interface between Art.23 and Art.27, had proven 
controversial.  15  However, the Court of Justice’s decision in this case, which stated that 
the  lis pendens rule under Art.27 should give way to the rule on exclusive jurisdiction 
under Art.22, should not be deemed controversial or surprising. This interpretation of the 
relationship between Art.22 and Art.27 vindicates the English Court of Appeal’s ruling in 
 Speed Investments Ltd v  Formula One Holdings Ltd (No.2) .  16  
 236.  Kolassa  v  Barclays Bank Plc  17  
 Confl ict of laws—allocation of jurisdiction under Brussels regime—investor claims—
interpretation of Brussels I Regulation, Arts 5(1)(a), 5(3) and 15(1) 
 The claimant, K, was an Austrian domiciliary. Through an Austrian bank, D, K invested 
in bearer bonds issued by BB, a UK bank. Unfortunately for K, he suffered losses on his 
investment and consequently commenced proceedings against BB in Austria for breach of 
contract or tortious conduct. 
 One of the key issues for consideration concerned the Austrian court’s jurisdiction 
over this case. K argued that the Austrian court had jurisdiction, pursuant to Brussels I 
Regulation, Art.15(1)(c). Alternatively, he claimed that the court’s jurisdiction could be 
premised on Arts 5(1)(a) and 5(3). BB challenged the substance of K’s claim and, also, the 
Austrian court’s jurisdiction. 
 Accordingly, the Austrian court stayed its proceedings and sought a preliminary ruling 
on whether an investor who has acquired a bearer bond from an intermediary could sue 
the issuer of the bond based on (1) Art.15(1), as a consumer; (2) Art.5(1)(a), for breach 
of contract; or (3) Art.5(3), for tortious conduct. (4) Additionally, the Austrian court 
sought to know the extent to which it should engage in taking of evidence in relation to 
disputed facts. 
 Held : (1) In a case such as this one, jurisdiction under Art.15(1) cannot be 
invoked where a bearer bond has been acquired from the issuer, through a third-party 
intermediary, without there being a concluded contract between the acquirer and the 
issuer. (2) Article 5(1)(a) cannot provide the basis for jurisdiction in this instance because 
 13 .  See, eg,  Sanders v  Van der Putte (Case 73/77) [1977] ECR 2383 and  Reichert and Kockler v  Dresdner 
Bank (Case 115/88) [1990] ECR I-27. 
 14 .  (Case C-116/02) [2003] ECR I-14693;  [2004] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 222 . 
 15 .  See, eg, J Mance, “Exclusive jurisdiction agreements and European ideals” (2004) 120 LQR 357. 
 16 .  (Also known as  Bambino Holdings Ltd v  Speed Investments Ltd [2004] EWCA Civ 1512; [2005] 1WLR 
1936). 
 17 .  (Case C-375/13) [2015] ECR I-0000. 
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the issuer has not freely undertaken to assume obligation towards the acquirer. (3) A court 
of a Member State shall have jurisdiction based on Art.5(3) where the damage in question 
has occurred directly in the claimant’s bank account held with a bank established in 
that forum. (4) When ascertaining jurisdiction over an international private law dispute 
under the Brussels I Regulation, there is no need to perform a detailed assessment of 
all the disputed facts that relate to the question of jurisdiction and also the substance of 
the dispute. 
 Comment : In this case, the ECJ reiterated its earlier position in  Kronhofer v  Maier .  18  In 
that case, the ECJ had ruled that, even where the claimant has suffered fi nancial damage 
in his country of domicile, it did not necessarily follow that the court in that jurisdiction 
could entertain the case under Art.5(3). However, Art.5(3) would confer jurisdiction on 
the claimant’s home court if the account which registers the loss is with a bank established 
in the claimant’s domicile.  19  
 237.  Winrow  v  Hemphill  20  
 Confl ict of laws—choice of law governing a non-contractual obligation—personal injury 
arising from road-traffi c accident—interpretation of Rome II Regulation, Art.4(1)–(3) 
 The claimant, C, and the fi rst defendant, D1, were both English nationals whose husbands 
served in the British army. C had moved to Germany in 2001 when her husband was posted 
there. In the following years, C lived and worked in Germany. Additionally, three of her 
four children went to school in Germany. Nevertheless, the family had always intended to 
return to England in 2014, the year in which the husband had planned to leave the army. 
 In November 2009, C suffered serious injuries in a road-traffi c accident in Germany. 
At the time of the collision, she was a passenger in the car driven by D1. Some 18 months 
after the accident, C and her family returned to England. Soon thereafter, C commenced 
proceedings in England against D1 and D2, D1’s English insurer. As liability had 
been conceded, assessment of damages was the only issue for consideration. In this 
respect, the dispute’s governing law had to be ascertained. Under Rome II Regulation, 
Art.4(1)—which is the starting point in determining the law governing tortious claims—
the dispute was governed by German law. However, C argued that Art.4(1) should be 
departed from in favour of Art 4(2) or (3) because, at the time of the accident, all the 
parties had been habitually resident in England and the tort was manifestly more closely 
connected with England. 
 Decision : German law was applicable to the dispute, pursuant to Art.4(1). 
 Held : (1) At the time of the accident, the claimant had not been habitually resident 
in England. (2) The tort in question was not manifestly more closely connected with 
England. 
 Comment : This is one of the fi rst instances in which the English court has ruled on the 
interpretation of the various provisions within Rome II Regulation concerning tortious 
claims. As for the application of Art.4(2), the court found that there was no evidence 
 18 .  (Case C-168/02) [2004] ECR I-6009;  [2005] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 284 . 
 19 .  At [55]. 
 20 .  [2014] EWHC 3164 (QB); [2015] ILPr 12 (QB: Slade J). 
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to suggest that, at the time of the accident, C and her family were habitually resident in 
England. In this respect, Slade J considered that it was immaterial that C and her family 
had always intended eventually to return to England. 
 Slade J stated that the bar was set “high” for triggering Art.4(3).  21  She emphasised 
that, when seeking to identify the country with which the tort is manifestly more closely 
connected, the court can take into account every possible factor, including those that are 
considered under Art.4(1) and (2).  22  
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